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
**THE FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP
IN THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY
FRAMEWORK**

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Thomas-Durell Young

July 15, 1991

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FOREWORD

European affairs continue their rapid evolution in the new post-cold war era. Currently, many of our Western European allies are pressing toward greater economic, political and military integration as they attempt to create a unified Europe. Without any doubt, at the heart of this drive to achieve greater integration is the Franco-German bilateral relationship, upon which the eventual success in achieving a unified Europe is widely recognized as being dependent.

The Strategic Studies Institute has taken a particular interest in this subject which is often unappreciated in the United States and published an earlier study, *The Franco-German Concordat: The Key to Future Western European Security and Stability*, in February 1990. This complex relationship has undergone important changes since that time. One of the authors of that study, Dr. Thomas-Durell Young, presented a paper on the subject at the Aspen Institute Berlin in April 1991, which afforded the opportunity to revisit the subject. Dr. Young argues that current difficulties in the relationship, albeit potentially serious, are not terminal. A healthy Paris-Bonn relationship is in U.S. interests, he argues, and provides policy recommendations to U.S. officials to encourage its repair.

The author would like to express his gratitude to Colonels John J. Hickey, Paul G. Davenport and Robert R. Ulin, and Monsieur Francois Heisbourg, for their constructive comments made on earlier drafts of this manuscript.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this essay as a contribution to the field of European security studies.



Karl W. Robinson
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG has been a National Security Affairs Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute since 1988. Prior to this appointment, he was a country risk analyst for BERI, S.A., a Swiss-based consulting firm. Dr. Young received his Ph.D. from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, Switzerland; his M.A. from the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University; and is a 1990 graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has published extensively on U.S. alliance issues with particular emphasis on Western Europe and the Southwest Pacific.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP IN THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY FRAMEWORK

Introduction.

While it has generally been accepted in Western Europe that the vitality of the Franco-German bilateral relationship has been fundamental to European integration, U.S. policy toward this relationship over the years has been characterized by ambivalence and, at times, outright opposition. For instance, following the signing of the 1963 Elysee Treaty between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, U.S. officials expressed disapproval of the accord, because it was felt that the arrangement introduced an unwanted element of "singularity" into European security and diplomatic affairs.¹ Consequently, Bonn's fidelity to the United States resulted in the full implementation of the security provisions of the treaty being delayed until January 1988.² Apparently, U.S. policy concerning Franco-German relations can be found in Helmut Sonnenfeldt's observation that Washington will support efforts at European integration only as long as it is not achieved at the expense of degrading transatlantic institutions (read NATO).³ While this position might be interpreted as being passive to say the least, the fact remains that further integration in Western Europe depends upon a functioning and close Paris-Bonn dialogue. In consequence, it is very much in U.S. national interests to see intimate bilateral relations in this respect. To be sure, furthering European integration is not without its potential and actual costs to Washington, e.g., the Single Economic Act ("EC 92"). Nonetheless, the alternative to integration holds out the possibility, no matter how remote, of disunity in regional political affairs, and the accompanying chance of Western European countries "renationalizing" their defense policies—clearly an eventuality the Western Alliance in general is keen to avoid.

As to the current condition of Franco-German relations, if the mid-to-latter 1980s witnessed the zenith of this relationship,⁴ it is not going too far to argue that the state of

present ties are poor at worst and ambivalent at best. There are three reasons for this situation. First, and clearly most important, the unification of the Federal Republic and Democratic Republic of Germany has had the obvious effect of altering the political and economic balance of power within the European Community. Second, well prior to the unification of Germany, bilateral defense relations between Paris and Bonn had reached an impasse, due to French unwillingness to revisit the most basic, if not sacrosanct, tenets of Gaullist security policy. Third, the stalling in the Franco-German relationship is related to the current lack of consensus within Western Europe concerning if, and how, further European integration will proceed.

This situation places the United States in a difficult position, of course. While it is evident that Western Europe is not on the verge of disunity, it is, nevertheless, clear that issues of a divisive nature require attention by these nations; if left unattended they could have a negative influence on efforts at integration. For example, out-of-area security considerations and reform of military structures within NATO, which could negatively affect certain members of the alliance, are just two security-related issues that will have to be successfully addressed if European integration is to be furthered. While it is optimistic perhaps to assume that a revitalized Franco-German relationship could in itself provide the necessary impetus for further constructive European integration, one could safely assume that achieving the vision of a politically unified EC without it would very difficult indeed.

The purpose of this essay is to assess the current problems in Franco-German relations and outline possible options for U.S. policy which could have a positive influence on their mending. While acknowledging that Washington has a limited ability to "make" Paris and Bonn cooperate more closely in the future, there are, nevertheless, options available to the United States to exert a positive influence. Surprisingly, the one area where U.S. influence has the potential for being most constructive is in the area of security relations, in general, and alliance reform and addressing the out-of-area security issue, in particular.

Problems in the Relationship.

Before addressing possible solutions to present difficulties in Franco-German ties, it is appropriate to assess briefly the conditions which have produced the current situation. It is not the purpose of this essay to present an explanation of the evolution of bilateral relations subsequent to the signing of the Elysee Treaty, since this has already been articulated elsewhere.⁵ Rather, these issues are presented here solely to place the current state of affairs in their proper context. In respect to the current nadir, three events and issues identified above warrant explanation.

At the heart of the upheaval in Franco-German relations lies the nettlesome issue in that the unification of Germany on October 3, 1990, produced the largest non-Russian continental power (with an economic potential that will likely dwarf its neighbors in short order), which is now a sovereign country, albeit tightly entwined in Western international economic, political and security institutions. The mere existence of a united Germany has had the effect of altering fundamentally the political balance not only in Europe as a whole, but within the EC as well. The previous "balance of imbalances" among the four key countries with comparable populations (i.e., France, the Federal Republic, Britain, and Italy), no longer exists.⁶

Yet probably most significant from the perspective of French policy is that the mere act of unification killed once and for all the perception (greatly encouraged by Paris and tacitly accepted by Bonn) that France was the senior partner in the bilateral relationship. The act of unification showed this image to be but a mere myth. Just as Bonn must come to terms with the fact that it has all but become an incomplete superpower, so must Paris accept its new status in Europe and refocus its political aspirations.⁷

Yet, well prior to the opening of the Berlin Wall, strains were becoming evident in bilateral ties. During the period of 1982 to approximately 1987, relations between the two countries were probably at their height. Fifteen years after the Elysee Treaty was signed, a protocol was effected implementing the accord's security provisions, thereby establishing, belatedly, a

bilateral defense council, a secretariat and subordinate bodies to manage cooperation.⁸ However, it is often forgotten that it was Paris which began the process of reining in cooperative initiatives in the area of defense. From hindsight it is evident that conventional defense cooperation had reached its limits since Bonn was unwilling to enter into bilateral arrangements which were supplementary to NATO, no matter how disillusioned Bonn was becoming with U.S. policy.

One of the principal reasons behind Bonn's desire to effect closer bilateral security ties with France in the early 1980s was due to what German officials saw as a wavering in Washington's nuclear commitment to the security of their country. The Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative, the Intermediate- and Shorter-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and especially, the 1986 Reykjavik Summit, where President Reagan seriously considered President Gorbachev's proposal to eliminate their countries' respective intercontinental ballistic missile forces, left many in the frontline NATO state anxious of U.S. intentions.⁹ The French nuclear force, notwithstanding its relatively small size,¹⁰ did present the advantage of being controlled from the continent, while not being as susceptible to arms control limitations or reductions as U.S. weapons.¹¹

Despite President Mitterrand's February 1986 public statement promising to consult where appropriate with German officials prior to the use of French nuclear forces on German soil,¹² Bonn apparently has wanted additional assurances. This has led to what Francois de Rose characterized as the "nuclear obstacle" to closer cooperation between the two countries in defense, since to meet Bonn's wishes would compromise long-standing Gaullist security policy tenets.¹³ This was apparently not a battle President Mitterrand had been willing to undertake until very recently, and will be dealt with below. Suffice it to say that prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, his comments made before the *Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense nationale* in October 1988, typified French attitudes. In this speech, the president made reference to limits in bilateral Franco-German defense cooperation, and stressed the need for further economic integration. Only then, he stated,

would Europe realize that it "cannot exist without the ability to defend itself."¹⁴

Lastly, the lack of visible purpose in Franco-German relations is directly related to the still unanswered question of the EC's future. Notwithstanding the likely success of achieving a single market through the implementation of EC 92, Western Europe is quickly approaching a crossroads of historical proportion. While President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl have strongly endorsed the concept of political union¹⁵ (a process which incidently was reinvigorated in April 1990 as a means to mend the Paris-Bonn relationship),¹⁶ and Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis has tirelessly pressed for the EC to assume a greater role in diplomatic and defense issues through its amalgamation of the Western European Union (WEU),¹⁷ the fact remains that there is far from being a consensus within the EC as to its ultimate goals. The decision upon the application of neutral Austria for membership in the Community in 1993 will force that body, possibly once and for all, to decide upon whether it aspires to become a true political body, or as in the words of Chancellor Kohl, merely a *Zollverein*.¹⁸ At such an important moment in European history, the value of an intimate Paris-Bonn axis becomes indisputably crucial.

Stenghtening Security Ties: Options.

At the outset, it needs to be understood that Washington has available to it limited options. The litany of real and perceived differences that exist between these two countries, within the context of a long past history of enmity, is not a situation easily mitigated by any outside state. Nonetheless, in view of the present ongoing changes taking place in Europe, there are possibilities to exert U.S. influence in the areas of security which could contribute to a rapprochement in Franco-German relations. Specifically, possible areas for U.S. attention relate to the ongoing study to reorganize NATO military structures and the perennially divisive (if not indeed, "Politically in-Correct") out-of-area issue.

Reforming NATO's Command and Control Structure. Regarding French and German perceptions of NATO, both can

be said to have had almost mutually exclusive stands regarding Paris' position in the Alliance. The Federal Republic has long attempted to encourage the French to reenter NATO wartime command and control arrangements and structures (and thereby increase their conventional defense of Germany), just as Paris assiduously has refrained from acquiescing to Bonn's initiatives. Indeed, one of the principal rationales behind the Federal Republic's support for bilateral security ties with France has been to attempt to draw Paris back into NATO structures.¹⁹

Within the context of the reform of NATO's strategy, force structures, and wartime command and control arrangements, it is apparent that Bonn is very keen to remain within NATO. No major political party in the Federal Republic advocates either its leaving the alliance, or the immediate removal of alliance forces from its soil.²⁰ Continued membership in NATO contains the assurance to Bonn's neighbors that the *Bundeswehr* will remain firmly integrated within NATO wartime command and control structures, thereby vitiating the need to create a *Generalstab* and associated national command and control structures (not to mention national war planning above corps level) with all the emotional sensitivities such acts would produce in Europe. Moreover, one needs to recall that the Soviet Western Group of Forces, with its approximately 300,000 Soviet soldiers (plus dependents), will remain on the territory of the Federal Republic until the end of 1994. Should tensions develop while these forces are in the process of withdrawing from the Federal Republic, the deterrent value of NATO forces is incalculable. Thus, despite Chancellor Kohl's support for political integration within the EC, it is clear that Bonn continues to see its basic security requirements being met by continued membership in NATO, as opposed to the EC or the WEU.

This position, of course, places France in a difficult dilemma. One would suspect that the rationales for Paris to rejoin NATO structures would be strong. Reentry into some NATO command and control structures would enable France to work to ensure that the Federal Republic remains enmeshed in Western security structures and the United States maintains

its military presence on the continent. Unfortunately, such options are extremely sensitive political issues in a country that continues to adhere publicly to Gaullist defense tenets of independence. While in recent years this "independence" has been shown to be rather qualified,²¹ it nonetheless remains an important domestic political factor.

It should not be surprising, therefore, that some within the French *défense* establishment during Jean-Pierre Chevenement's tenure as Defense Minister were reassessing the possibility of reentry into NATO structures. This has coincided with the ongoing NATO strategy review, in which France moved in March 1991 to participate.²² While it is not yet known what Defense Minister Pierre Joxe's position is on this issue, let alone President Mitterrand's, whose ultimate authority in diplomacy and defense is supreme under the terms of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, it is evident that France will not make a significant move until such time that the governing political realities are clear, prior to committing itself to any reintegration. One can be assured that in view of the historical sensitivity of this issue (one should recall that the Mendes-France Government fell in February 1954 in part over the issue of French participation in the European Defense Community),²³ it is still an open question whether France will rejoin a reformed NATO command and control structure.

It is within the context of alliance reform that U.S. efforts could contribute to France's reentry into alliance structures. While it would not be prudent, nor is it likely, for the alliance to concede to France's every wish, there are symbolic and actual reforms to be offered. For instance, it is not widely understood outside of the Francophone world that the term "*l'OTAN*" has taken on a considerable pejorative connotation over the years. While it is not being proposed that the term "NATO" ought to be dropped completely, it may be worthwhile to consider different nomenclature for elements of the alliance which are to be reformed. In other words, the United States and its allies could make it easier for French officials to sell to *la classe politique*, reentry to these structures, if it could be demonstrated that Paris was not rejoining the same alliance structures General de Gaulle rejected in 1966.

It could well turn out that the present time is an auspicious time for France to rejoin NATO wartime command and control structures in view of the fact that the existing arrangements within NATO could be altered following the conclusion of the ongoing strategy review process. It is simply too early to speculate accurately as to what type of documents will replace MC 14/3 and MC 48/3, which embody the alliance's strategy of flexible response.²⁴ Nonetheless, security conditions point toward the possibility of reforming military structures which could be acceptable to France, particularly in regard to command and control arrangements. Moreover, one should not conclude that Paris is totally intransigent concerning command and control matters. In the Persian Gulf War, for example French forces; naval, air and ground, were "chopped" to U.S. allied commanders during the conflict. Conversely, French forces were given operational control over U.S. forces during certain periods in the campaign.²⁵ Thus, Paris may be more accepting of allied command and control arrangements *under the right circumstances* than previously thought.

Indeed, it is difficult to accept how NATO's existing command and control arrangements can escape what could be substantial change. It is clear that there will be fewer in-place national corps in Central Europe over the coming years; from a current level of eight down to six main defense corps, in addition to the Rapid Reaction Corps. The *Bundeswehr* alone is to lose three or four divisions by 1994 and reduce its ground forces to 370,000 personnel within a three corps structure which will be integrated with the Territorial Army.²⁶ In such a situation, the creation of multinational corps and in consequence, the likely dissolution of the "layer-cake" forward deployment of forces in Germany concept, will produce new and different command and control requirements.²⁷ Should a strategy be adopted by the alliance based upon "reconstitution," then it is possible to loosen existing command and control arrangements. For instance, one could envisage future NATO command and control arrangements in wartime being developed to match the operational tasks and forces chopped to allied commanders, as opposed to predetermined structures. Examples of such structures include command and control defined by functional, specialized and maneuver

requirements, as opposed to solely geographical. Should Washington decide that having France back in the military structure of the alliance is worth the cost of a looser command and control structure and the Soviet military threat continues to diminish in immediacy, encouraging France to join in the redefinition of NATO's military structures could provide the necessary impetus for France to reintegrate itself into NATO. President Mitterrand's April 13, 1991 speech to the Ecole de Guerre where he acknowledged that "for the present and for many years to come, Western Europe's defense can only be envisaged in the context of respect for the Atlantic Alliance," obviously points toward a new approach by Paris toward NATO; albeit many difficult obstacles remain to be overcome.²⁸

The Out-of-Area Issue. If Paris is guilty of over-sensitivity regarding defense independence, then Bonn is culpable of being politically unable to accept responsibility for out-of-area security responsibilities. Chancellor Kohl has publicly committed himself to allow *Bundeswehr* forces to be sent outside the European theater in the future,²⁹ and the deployment of German forces to Iran in April 1991 would appear to have created a needed precedent for such operations.³⁰ Notwithstanding these events, Bonn's position toward out-of-area issues will surely remain a sensitive political issue. This is unfortunate for a number of reasons, not the least being that German views are increasingly not being mirrored by its traditional allies.³¹ Population growth that far outstrips industrial expansion has sent a surge of Arabs to Europe in search of jobs now being taken by equally desperate, but more welcome (*vide* Christian), East Europeans who are willing to integrate themselves into European society. At the same time, West European investment and aid are being redirected eastward, leaving North African countries as an increasingly destitute playground for radical anti-Western fundamentalists and pan-Arab nationalists with increasing access to long-range weapons of mass destruction. This situation is widely recognized in France as posing a potentially serious threat to French security.³² Any meaningful bilateral security relationship between Paris and Bonn must have provisions for meeting these potential threats jointly.

In view of the commitment by Chancellor Kohl to seek alteration of the Basic Law, it would appear safe to assume that the Federal Republic's response to the Persian Gulf War was *sui generis*. It is simply asking too much to assume that a CDU/CSU/FDP coalition, and perhaps in time even a SPD-led coalition government, would refuse to send forces to a conflict on the periphery in the future. If anything is certain, Bonn will be unlikely to attempt to "buy" its way out of a future campaign in light of the Persian Gulf experience where allied criticism of German policy *increased* as financial contributions to the war effort rose.³³ Notwithstanding the immense domestic economic challenges and security problems which exist in eastern Germany (i.e., the continued presence of the Soviet Western Group of Forces), nor to ignore the severe sensitivity in the country concerning the use of military force, future governments will surely be more receptive to participation with traditional allies in such conflicts. After all, to refuse to act in these campaigns is nothing less than an act of self-singularization and hardly in accord with attempts to forge unified diplomatic and security policies within the EC.

At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the prospect of equipping even a small element of the *Bundeswehr* for self-supported and sustained operations outside of central Europe could not be directed at the Federal Defense Ministry at a worse time. Simply stated, power projection and accompanying requisite combat support and logistic support are expensive capabilities. At present, the *Bundeswehr* is confronted with the requirement to reduce personnel levels from its current size of 515,000 to 370,000 by the end of 1994, in accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-German agreement reached between Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev at Stavropol in July and codified by treaty in September 1990.³⁴ The Federal Defense Ministry is also faced with the challenge of planning for the defense of the new *Laender* of the Federal Republic, without NATO forces stationed in the east. One can safely conclude, therefore, that it is unlikely that the *Bundeswehr* will be in the position to equip and train itself unilaterally for these types of campaigns outside the Central Region for some time.³⁵ Nevertheless, press reports of Bonn's intentions to create a three brigade (with air

support) force, to be contributed to a proposed NATO rapid action force, is clearly a step in the right direction.³⁶

Concurrently, other options for a multinational approach to these types of conflicts appear to be limited for a variety of political reasons. Despite the fact that NATO is in the midst of what could be fundamental reform and perhaps in search of new missions in the post-cold war world, it could prove to be fruitless to press for the formal inclusion within the alliance of out-of-area responsibilities.³⁷ There is too much emotional baggage in Europe which will work against such an eventuality and indeed, it is unwarranted. The final chapter on the history of the cold war has yet to be written and the events in the Baltic Republics of the Soviet Union during winter 1990 point toward the likelihood that NATO will continue to have considerable relevance in its traditional role to its members for some time to come.³⁸ Thus, given the importance of maintaining consensus for the continuation of NATO on its most important mission, introducing such a divisive issue as out-of-area responsibilities could be counterproductive, especially at a time when the alliance is undergoing review.

Short of creating some new security organization that will deal with the issue of extra-regional security, it becomes apparent that the WEU is the appropriate forum in which to deal with these issues. As the sole Western European organization that 1) concerns itself with its members' security, and 2) is *interested* in dealing with the out-of-area, the WEU is well situated to play a leading role in addressing its members' security concerns.³⁹ If one assumes that the WEU is the appropriate organization to direct Western European engagement in out-of-area operations, a major problem becomes apparent in regard to what roles the United States and NATO are to play. In addition, it is necessary to define what types of cooperation and planning are politically acceptable and militarily sufficient.

In terms of institutional structure, it would appear to be reasonable that, at a very minimum, a formal liaison relationship and joint military body need to be created between NATO and the WEU. There are a number of reasons for this. First, it would enable the Western Alliance to benefit from an

enormous amount of military expertise that exists in NATO, without necessitating replication. To be sure, power projection and sustainment over potentially vast distances are not areas with which NATO has overly concerned itself, and would require substantial doctrinal and conceptual assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom and France.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, the basis for cooperation and coordination between defense forces exists within NATO and should be utilized. Second, a joint institutional arrangement would not limit either of these two bodies from engaging in reorganization and reform, at the moment or in the future. Both organizations play important roles in their respective principal areas of responsibility and should not be hindered in any way from reforming themselves to meet changing security and political conditions.

The basic purpose of achieving a liaison between these two organizations would be to allow for the WEU to provide the necessary political framework for its members to engage in out-of-area operations, while largely employing existing NATO expertise. It is interesting to note that in spite of the WEU's strong interest in out-of-area contingencies however, its membership does not include NATO members outside of the Central Region, i.e., Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey. This would not present any major legal or political impediments since one of the purposes of creating a joint liaison body between NATO and the WEU would be to enable participation by NATO members who are not part of the WEU.

Such a proposal, therefore, could have the character of serving as a catalyst for further defense integration among Western European nations, thereby lending support to two of Bonn's long-term objectives: furthering European integration, while maintaining the trans-Atlantic link. Since a wartime command and control structure would not have to be predetermined prior to an agreement by the participants to deploy forces, this structure would not have the same political baggage that alienated France from military integration in the Western Alliance in the past. Finally, in view of Paris' interest in out-of-area threats to its security, a strong case could be

made to encourage France to take a leading role in the establishment and development of this liaison body.

Indeed, to ensure a definite WEU "flavor" to this combined structure (which may be essential for its acceptance), it would be wise to limit the planning headquarters' staff to seconded field grade officers from WEU members. In time of crisis, the staff would be complemented by personnel seconded from participating states and these officers would take the lead in planning and operations specific to the contingency. The small permanent staff would act as custodians of alliance interoperability with the task of simply maintaining and testing it through periodic exercises, and, in crisis, providing a basis for expansion. This cadre staff could also prepare force tailored packages to operate in various conditions, e.g., desert, jungle, over-the-beach, airmobile, airborne, etc. It may also be wise to have this body serve as the planning headquarters above a rapid reaction corps, made up of WEU members, whose creation has been suggested by that organization's Secretary General, Dr. Willem van Eekelen.⁴¹ It could also thwart French efforts in particular to create an out-of-area military formation, exclusive of U.S. participation.⁴²

As regards the actual type of military planning that would facilitate future joint responses to out-of-area contingencies, very little would be required. As long as the NATO military structure continues in existence and allied forces conduct regular field training, command post, and logistics exercises, the actual military requirements of this joint NATO-WEU body would be very modest. What could be required, and this could be easily carried out within existing NATO structures and programs, would be to hold more air-transportable/airmobile and amphibious maneuvers, as well as logistics projection and sustainment exercises among countries possessing these capabilities. Wherever possible, existing NATO procedures, standards and methods would be employed to avoid duplicating efforts within the alliance and adding a needless new layer of procedures to be employed by allied defense forces.

It needs to be clearly understood, and would have to be carefully explained to the publics of alliance members, that

participation in developing this type of planning methodology would not by any means imply a nation's precommitment to support a specific out-of-area campaign. Rather, it would enable the alliance members' armed forces to have an existing military capability to conduct joint operations in instances where the political leadership of each country felt its national interests so dictated. One would think that these projection and sustainment capabilities would complement current thinking in NATO⁴³ which is attempting to direct more attention to the security requirements of the flank countries which have not seen any diminution in the Soviet military threat. With few, if any, exceptions, the requirements for campaigns on the flanks would be very similar to out-of-area requirements, as recently suggested by Admiral Dieter Wellershoff.⁴⁴

Conclusion.

It should be evident that while Washington's influence in regard to ameliorating Franco-German relations is limited, it is significant, particularly during this period of alliance review. Fundamentally, both the Federal Republic and France need to identify clearly their own national aspirations within the altered European security landscape and only then can they discern the new terms of their bilateral relationship. All available evidence points toward both Paris and Bonn wanting to press forward with European integration as quickly as possible. This should be supported by Washington, assuming of course that such actions do not result in the United States becoming marginalized from European political and security affairs. As long as this condition is met and integration proceeds, it would be unlikely that European countries would seriously consider the likelihood of moving toward the renationalization of their respective defense policies.

In light of these apparently favorable conditions, one could see where a passive approach on the part of U.S. officials toward Franco-German relations could easily prevail, particularly in view of the more pressing issues facing Washington. Such a course of inaction could be a fundamental mistake. Despite the current pressing importance of concluding a favorable and lasting peace settlement in the Persian Gulf, it needs to be recognized that in the final analysis,

U.S. interests in Europe transcend all other regions. And, irrespective of the apparent favorable situation the Western Alliance enjoys vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, many uncertainties remain. The ultimate outcome of efforts toward political union in the EC, the emerging security ambiguity of the former members of the Warsaw Pact, and the perceived marginalization from the Central Region of the alliance members on the Flanks,⁴⁵ combine to demonstrate that NATO has very serious security and diplomatic challenges to overcome if it is to be successful in maintaining stability in Europe. A constructive role played by Washington is recognized by all in Europe as a *sine qua non* if atavistic enmity is to be avoided. Nonetheless, the role of U.S. forces and the modalities of their presence need to be rethought if the political basis for their very presence is not to be lost. Thus, the removal of force concentrations from urban areas, agreement to participate in multinational corps, and diminished exercise schedules are some relatively simple unilateral steps in this direction.⁴⁶

At the same time, however, as argued above, other options are available to U.S. officials in regard to alliance review and reform, which have not only the potential to be beneficial for U.S. interests, but also for improving the basis for Franco-German relations. While acknowledging that nations are expected to act in their own national interests, it would behoove Washington to use its influence to attempt to improve the conditions upon which continued allied security cooperation will be contingent.

Thus in regard to France, existing wartime command and control arrangements in NATO need to be revisited if the alliance's military structure is to remain relevant in the eyes of alliance members. If France could be induced to reenter these structures, albeit at not too small a political price to discourage future "defections," then strong considerations should be given to such proposals. If the current trend in Europe continues toward defense integration, then Paris could make itself irrelevant to the European security debate if it misses its current opportunity to reintegrate itself into the Western Alliance.

Concurrently, all indications point to the conclusion that the out-of-area issue is not one that is going to recede in the future and requires addressing by the alliance. Admittedly, this is a politically sensitive issue, particularly in the Federal Republic. However, solutions need to be found if the Western Alliance is to show that it is capable of changing to meet altered security conditions. After all, as Bonn found out in regard to the Persian Gulf War, countries with interests everywhere, but responsibilities nowhere, run the serious risk of relying upon others for their protection (with evidently little gratitude despite generous assistance)⁴⁷ with little or no influence as to the manner in which these conflicts are handled.⁴⁸ By approaching these security challenges within a collective arrangement, finite German and French defense resources can be saved, while contributing to European integration.

To be sure, it is problematic whether the "solution" to these security issues by themselves would have the effect of improving relations between Paris and Bonn. Fundamentally, of course, such improvement in bilateral diplomatic relations is contingent upon a new political understanding between these two European Great Powers. Yet, it would be a mistake on the part of Washington not to take advantage of the current alliance strategy review to improve conditions wherever possible, which could have a positive influence on removing potential areas of disruption in European and transatlantic affairs. Admittedly, it would be naive to consider that the achievement of the above proposals would necessarily be a panacea for the Franco-German relationship. Notwithstanding this element of realism, to ignore the potentially ameliorating influence these reforms in security structures could have is to miss a rare historical moment to achieve a strengthened European security pillar, firmly entrenched in the transatlantic community.

ENDNOTES

1. See, Ian Gambles, "Prospects for West European Security Cooperation," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 244, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989, p. 47.

2. See, Peter Schmidt, "The Franco-German Defence and Security Council," *Aussenpolitik*, Volume 40, No. 4, 1989, pp. 360-371.

3. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The European Pillar: The American View" in, "The Changing Strategic Landscape," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 235, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989, p. 103.

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7. See, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, July 19, 1990.

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10. See, Francois Heisbourg, "The British and French Nuclear Forces," *Survival*, Volume 31, No. 4, July-August 1989, pp. 301-320.

11. See, Robbin F. Laird, *The Soviet Union, The West and the Nuclear Arms Race*, New York: New York University Press, 1986, pp. 85-139.

12. *Le Monde* (Paris), February 28, 1986.

13. Francois de Rose, *European Security and France*, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983, p. 95.

14. See the speech of French President Francois Mitterrand to the *Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense nationale* in Paris, October 11, 1988, reprinted in *Europa-Archiv*, Volume 43, No. 23, December 1988, D673.

15. This was recently reiterated by foreign ministers Genscher and Dumas at the February EC foreign ministers' meeting. See, Agence France-Presse (Paris), February 4, 1991 in, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*-91-024, February 5, 1991, pp. 5-6.

16. See, Agence France-Presse (Paris), April 14, 1991 in, *FBIS-WEU*-90-076, April 19, 1991, p. 1.

17. See, *Le Monde* (Paris), September 22, 1990.

18. See DPA (Hamburg), September 13, 1990 in *FBIS-WEU-90-179*, September 14, 1990, p. 1.

19. See, W. R. Smyser, *Restive Partners: Washington and Bonn Diverge*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 60-61.

20. Even Oskar Lafontaine stated himself in favor of remaining in NATO and retaining U.S. forces in Germany. See, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, March 30, 1990. This was also reflected in the Security Policy Paper issued in spring 1990. See, DPA (Hamburg), April 25, 1990 in, *FBIS-WEU-90-082*, April 27, 1990, p. 17.

21. See, for example, *The Washington Post*, May 29, 1989 and June 2, 1989.

22. See Agence France-Presse (Paris), March 8, 1991 in, *FBIS-WEU-91-047*, March 9, 1991, p. 19.

23. See Philip M. Williams, *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic*, Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1964, pp. 419-420.

24. For reports of the review's progress see, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, December 5, 1990.

25. See the interview with General Maurice Schmidt, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces in, *Le Figaro* (Paris), February 9-10, 1991.

26. See, *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), February 10, 1991.

27. For background on multinational corps see, Karl Lowe and Thomas-Durell Young, "Multinational Corps in NATO," *Survival*, Volume 33, No. 1, January-February 1991, pp. 66-77.

28. Cf., "Quelle securite en Europe a l'aube du XXIeme siecle?", *Allocution prononcee par Monsieur Francois Mitterrand, President de la Republique a l'occasion de la cloture du Forum de l'Ecole de Guerre, Paris, 11 avril 1991*; and, *The Washington Post*, June 12, 1991.

29. See Chancellor Helmut Kohl's New Year's Eve Address in, *Bulletin*, Bonn: Federal Press and Information Agency, No. 1, January 2, 1991.

30. See, DPA (Hamburg), April 29, 1991 in, *FBIS-WEU-91-083*, April 30, 1991, p. 6.

31. See, *The Washington Post*, January 29, 1991.

32. For a conservative French view of Islamic threats from the South see Michel Debre's polemic in *Le Quotidien de Paris*, June 26, 1990.

33. See, *Der Spiegel*, January 28, 1991, pp. 16-23.
34. See, *The New York Times*, July 17, 1990; and ADN (Berlin), September 12, 1990 in, *FBIS-WEU-90-177-U*, September 12, 1990, pp. 3-6.
35. See the interview with Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg in, *The Financial Times* (London), January 31, 1991.
36. See, *Die Welt* (Hamburg), March 12, 1991.
37. See, Douglas Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems since 1949*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.
38. Cf., *The Washington Post*, September 16, 1990.
39. See, Willem van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," *Survival*, Volume 32, No. 6, November-December 1990, pp. 519-532.
40. Note that the deployment of French forces to the Persian Gulf War demonstrated serious shortcomings in their combat, combat support and combat service support structures for these types of missions. See, *Le Figaro* (Paris), January 31, 1991.
41. See, *The New York Times*, December 26, 1990.
42. See, *The Washington Post*, May 28, 1991.
43. See comments made by the SACEUR, General John Galvin, to the Times Journal Company, September 17, 1990 in, *Ace Output*, Volume 9, No. 4, November 1990, p. 2.
44. See, *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), March 3, 1991.
45. For Norwegian views on this issue, see *Aftenposten* (Oslo), October 26, 1990 in, *FBIS-WEU-90-221*, November 15, 1990, p. 36.
46. I argue these points in my piece, *The New European Security Calculus: Implications for the U.S. Army*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 3, 1991, *passim*.
47. See, *Der Spiegel*, January 28, 1991, pp. 16-23.
48. See George Melloan's piece in *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), March 4, 1991, which argues that only those countries that contributed forces to the Persian Gulf War should have a say in the peace process.

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